OPINION — “I think the real technical challenge [for the Golden Dome space-based missile defense system] will be building of the space-based interceptor. That technology exists, I believe. I believe we have proven every element of the physics [to the point] that we can make it work. What we have not proven is, first, can I do it economically, and then second, can I do it at scale? Can I build enough satellites to get after the threat? Can I expand the industrial base fast enough to build those satellites? Do I have enough raw materials, et cetera?”
That was Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein, newly-Senate-confirmed head of the Golden Dome program, speaking last Tuesday during the Space Foundation’s Innovate Space: Global Economic Summit in Arlington, Virginia.
“I’ve been given 60 days to come up with the objective architecture I need,” Guetlein said during his July 22 fireside chat at the Summit with retired-Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. Raymond. “I owe that back to the deputy secretary of defense in 60 days. So in 60 days I’ll be able to talk in depth about, ‘Hey, this is our vision for what we want to get after for Golden Dome.’”
Back on January 27, when President Trump first announced his call for a multi-layered missile defense system — then Iron Dome, now Golden Dome — Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was given the initial task of developing “a reference architecture, capabilities-based requirements and an implementation plan,” within 60 days.
On May 20, during an Oval Office meeting, Trump said, “Today, I’m pleased to announce that we have officially selected an architecture for this state-of-the-art system that will deploy next-generation technologies across the land, sea, and space, including space-based sensors and interceptors.” Trump also named Guetlein to run the effort, adding he expected it to be completed by the end of his presidency in January 2029 at a cost of $175 billion.
Apparently, the Golden Dome architecture is still a work in progress and there are many who doubt it can be completed by January 2029 at a cost even close to $175 billion – if it can be completed at all.
Below I will try to discuss some of the complexities using one or two experts along with information from a past Space Force request-for-information (RFI) sent to potential contractors that described the capabilities and elements sought for the proposed Golden Dome network.
But let’s begin with what Guetlein promised during his conversation last week.
He said his initial plan, after delivering the Golden Dome network architecture, is to have “incremental demonstrations” of that network every six months. Work has already begun.
As a multi-layered system, Golden Dome will have a sensor level that detects and tracks air and missile threats; a command-and-control level (C2) that integrates data from sensors and coordinates operations; and interceptors to attack incoming enemy airborne/drone or missile targets. All three levels must work together to meet potential worldwide threats.
Last week, Guetlein said, “First and foremost is getting out of the gate on C2…We have to deliver on that vision of integrated command and control across the nation, across all these multiple [communications] platforms,” run by the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and Marine Corps. The military services are already working to connect their communications worldwide with sensors and weapons for conventional warfighting in the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) initiative.
For Golden Dome, as Guetlein put it, “Then we have to bring to bear an integrated network of sensors to be able to close the fire control loop with an integrated network of interceptors that have probably never been brought together before.”
Current U.S. military air defense systems are designed to defeat enemy aircraft/drones and ballistic missiles in their ground- and sea-based midcourse and terminal phases.
Golden Dome would be aimed at enemy missiles in their boost phase, which at launch produce heat blasts that can be seen from space for a short three-to-five-minute period. U.S. ballistic warning systems for boost phase would require space-based satellites for launch detection and then missile flight data to steer space-based interceptors from their home satellites to their targets at somewhere around 70-to-90 miles above the earth.
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Todd Harrison, a senior fellow in Foreign and Defense Policy at the American Enterprise Institute, has questioned Golden Dome. While he has written that the “sensing and command and control functions are complex, but entirely feasible,” his concerns are with the tight time requirements and the number of space-based satellite interceptors required.
As Harrison gamed out, “It may take 30 seconds or more before a launch is detected and a track is established. Even with the improved coverage of the new missile-tracking layer being deployed by the Space Force in the coming years, it is reasonable to assume that a space-based interceptor would have roughly 150 seconds to strike its target during the boost phase.”
Then there is what Harrison calls the “absenteeism problem.” Each space-based interceptor satellite is in low-earth orbit and for a majority of time is out of range of any missile it could intercept. According to Harrison’s calculations, “It takes about 950 interceptors spread out in orbit around the Earth to ensure that at least one is always in range to intercept a missile during its boost phase. If an adversary launches ten missiles in a salvo, it requires some 9,500 interceptors in space to ensure at least ten are within range to intercept all of the incoming missiles.”
Harrison concluded that given Russia and China each have over 300 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and not counting their sub-based ones, “scaling a space-based satellite interceptor system to meet the threat quickly becomes impractical.”
As for costs, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on May 5 estimated an earlier version of a limited, space-based, missile defense system would cost $542 billion — far above President Trump’s estimate.
However, CBO said that Golden Dome “could require a more expansive SBI [Space-Based Interceptor] capability than the systems examined in the previous studies. Quantifying those recent changes will require further analysis, which CBO is undertaking at your [Armed Services Committee Sens. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) and Angus King (I-Maine)] request.”
Back in May, after President Trump’s initial announcement, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced an industry day on June 11, in Huntsville, Alabama. It was later cancelled on June 9. Last Thursday, MDA announced a half-day Golden Dome Summit event for August 7, at the Von Braun Center, downtown Huntsville, “to engage both traditional and non-traditional vendors.”
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Meanwhile, the Space Force and MDA have been using RFIs to conduct market research on space-based interceptors and various elements and components being sought. As the Space Force explained, “The purpose of this RFI is to identify existing space-based missile defense capabilities and strategize on an architecture of a proliferated SBI constellation capable of boost-phase, mid-course-phase, and glide-phase intercepts. This is not a request for proposals. The Government does not intend to award a contract on the basis of this request.”
In its RFI, Space Force defines SBI notional architecture elements.
For example, Space-Based Interceptors (SBIs) are “a class of weapon systems designed to intercept and destroy enemy targets (missiles or associated payloads) in flight.”
It describes Exoatmospheric SBIs as “designed to destroy targets in the boost and mid-course phases outside the Earth’s atmosphere (above 74.5 miles), employing a kill vehicle (KV), guidance and navigation systems, communications, and propulsion for both initial engagement and terminal guidance maneuvers.”
The RFI is also seeking information leading to Endoatmospheric SBIs which are “designed to destroy targets within the Earth’s atmosphere (up to 74.5 miles),” but also “while accounting for atmospheric effects.”
The RFI mentions the need for “Terminal Guidance [which directs] the SBI to acquire and track the target autonomously after weapon release from its host satellite, executing precise maneuvers during the final phase of flight to achieve a successful intercept.” Another element sought after is “In-Flight Target Update [which] provides the ability to modify the SBI’s target information while it is in flight, based on new sensor data or changes in the threat trajectory.”
One of the more complicated parts listed in the RFI is the SBI Fire Control Element (FCE) which ingests data from the missile warning/missile track sensor layers and “performs weapon-target pairing based on rules of engagement to prioritize and engage multiple simultaneous targets.” In addition, the FCE “calculates the predicted intercept point for the assigned SBI.” It also “commands weapon release and continuously reassesses target track data to develop and send in-flight target updates…until the SBI switches to on-board terminal guidance.”
Needless to say, an SBI network able to attack boost-phase enemy missiles is a work in progress, as well as a dangerous step. I agree with Frank Rose, a former Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, with experience at the State and Defense Departments, who wrote of SBIs in the June 12, Defense News, “Such systems are not only technologically immature and prohibitively expensive, but risk destabilizing global security dynamics and degrading the space environment.”
With all these elements, the comprehensive missile defense envisioned by Golden Dome will be a heavy and complex undertaking that demands technical, political and financial alignment.
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