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The morning after the Brexit referendum in June 2016, the pound fell to its lowest level against the dollar in 31 years. Within five months, Donald Trump had won the White House. In India, Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party was busy converting a cultural movement into the operating system of the world’s largest democracy. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán had already told an audience that he was building an “illiberal state” on purpose.
None of that was a coincidence. None of it was new, either.
Nationalism — the idea that a people sharing a common identity should govern themselves in their own state — is one of the most powerful political forces of the last 250 years. It has broken empires, drawn borders, and started wars. Twice in my lifetime, commentators have declared it finished. Twice it has come back louder.
Two words people keep confusing
Patriotism is affection for a place and its habits: the bakery on the corner, the way your grandmother argued about football, the specific grey of a February sky. Nationalism is a claim about legitimacy — that the nation, not a monarch, a church or a distant parliament, is the proper source of political authority.
That claim can be generous or narrow. Political scientists generally split it into two families.
Civic nationalism
You belong because you accept the rules and take part. France leans on this model, treating citizenship as a contract rather than a bloodline. It is theoretically open to anyone. In practice it demands a great deal of assimilation, and it can be just as impatient with difference as the ethnic version.
Ethnic nationalism
You belong because of descent, language or ancestry. Germany’s pre-2000 citizenship law is the textbook case: it granted nationality to ethnic Germans arriving from Kazakhstan while withholding it from Turkish workers born in Berlin. The law has since changed. Japan and South Korea still run, more quietly, on similar assumptions.
Almost every real country is a mixture. Around 7,000 living languages are packed into 193 UN member states, so the ethnically pure nation-state is largely a fiction people tell themselves about their own history.
A short history of a surprisingly modern idea
Before the 18th century, most people owed loyalty to a village, a landlord or a faith. The nation as a mass loyalty is recent. Benedict Anderson called nations “imagined communities” — too large to ever meet your compatriots, yet intimate enough to feel like family. Print capitalism, mass schooling, railways and conscription did the imagining.
The French Revolution was the hinge. The levée en masse of 1793 turned subjects into citizens willing to die for a flag. Napoleon exported the idea at bayonet point, and Europe learned it fast, partly as a defence against him. The 1848 revolutions failed on the barricades but won the argument. Italy unified in 1861, Germany in 1871.
Then the map kept being redrawn: Woodrow Wilson’s self-determination after 1918, the messy mandate system that followed, and the great decolonising wave that took the UN from 51 founding members in 1945 to 193 today. If you want the full arc of how wars and treaties built the continent where modern nationalism first exploded, this account of Europe’s history as a continent forged by war, ideas and migration covers it properly.
Why it returned after everyone said it wouldn’t
The 1990s were supposed to settle the argument. Fukuyama’s “end of history,” the euro, the EU’s eastward expansion, the WTO: all of it pointed toward pooled sovereignty and thinning borders. Then the credit crunch hit in 2008 and took the certainties with it.
Five pressures did most of the work.
- Stagnant pay. Median wages in much of the rich world flatlined for a decade while housing, childcare and healthcare climbed. People who felt the system was rigged wanted a lever they could actually pull.
- Migration at scale. The UN counted 281 million people living outside their country of birth in 2020, up from 173 million in 2000. Rapid change in small towns produces rapid politics.
- Fragmented media. Broadcast television forced a shared set of facts. Feeds do the opposite, and outrage travels faster than nuance.
- Cultural speed. Attitudes to gender, language and history shifted within a single generation. Some of that was overdue justice; all of it was disorienting.
- Distance. Decisions taken in Brussels, Washington or Davos felt unanswerable. Nationalism’s core promise is that someone you can vote out is responsible.
Notice that only one of those is really about foreigners. Most of it is about control.
The money hiding under the flag
Brexit is the cleanest natural experiment we have. The UK’s own fiscal watchdog assumes the decision will leave long-run productivity about 4% lower than it would otherwise have been, and trade intensity has fallen. Leaving was expensive. The economists were right about the arithmetic and wrong about how much the arithmetic mattered to voters.
The same mood has pushed economic policy in the opposite direction, toward something you might call industrial nationalism. Washington committed $52.7 billion to the CHIPS Act to pull semiconductor manufacturing home. The EU answered with a €43 billion package. India launched production-linked incentives across electronics, solar and pharmaceuticals. Supply chains, once a technical subject, are now discussed as matters of national survival.
This is not a Western story
Modi’s 2014 victory turned Hindu nationalism from a cultural project into statecraft. China’s foreign policy runs on a script about a century of humiliation. Japan’s conservatives spent years loosening the pacifist constraints of 1947. Turkey, Brazil and the Philippines each produced their own version of the strongman-as-nation.
And the longer view matters here. The deep history of Asia as a continent that shaped nearly everything explains why post-colonial nationalism there looks so different from Europe’s: it grew out of anti-imperial movements, not out of state-building.
Africa tells a third story. In 1960, seventeen countries gained independence in twelve months, and the new leaders faced a choice between ethnic nations and inherited colonial borders. In 1964 the Organisation of African Unity chose borders, precisely to avoid the bloodshed that redrawing them would unleash. It was a deliberate, negotiated decision to restrain nationalism — and an underrated one.
When belonging turns into expulsion
The ugliest version of the question is always the same: who gets to stay? The partition of India in 1947 displaced somewhere between 10 and 20 million people. The century’s great nationalist wars, from 1914 to 1990, were never only about territory — six conflicts that rewrote the rules of war show how fast a claim about identity can become a claim on someone else’s life.
The United States never produced a serious ethnic-nationalist party, yet the same logic ran through its towns: deciding who belonged, then forcing out anyone who didn’t. That history is documented in this catalogue of forced removals of Black communities from American towns, and it is a useful corrective to the idea that this impulse belongs only to countries that use the word.
The uncomfortable case for it
It is dishonest to treat nationalism as purely a pathology. The Nordic welfare state was built on a strong sense of mutual obligation among people who expected to share a future. South Korea and Taiwan industrialised behind explicitly national projects. Anti-colonial nationalism liberated most of the planet. Scotland and Catalonia run civic, pro-European nationalist movements that sit comfortably on the left.
What separates the productive versions from the destructive ones is usually boring and institutional: whether courts can overrule the majority, whether minorities can become members, whether the story the nation tells about itself has room for people who arrived last year.
What the next decade actually looks like
The World Bank projects 216 million people could move within their own borders because of climate pressure by 2050. Africa’s population is heading toward 2.5 billion. Both are the kind of facts that national politics is built to argue about, and neither will be solved by a slogan.
Watch three things. First, whether nationalism stays a demand for control or becomes a demand for exclusion. Second, whether sub-state nationalism — a Scottish referendum, a Catalan one, a Flemish one — returns to the agenda once the current generation of leaders leaves. Third, whether the digital economy produces a new class of people whose loyalty is to a platform rather than a place.
The last 250 years suggest a pattern worth internalising. Nationalism does not go away when it is ignored; it goes quiet, reorganises, and comes back in a form its opponents are least equipped to answer. The version that emerged after 2016 was shaped by the crash of 2008. The version taking shape now is being shaped by housing costs, migration routes and a war on Europe’s eastern edge. Understanding the mechanism is more useful than being shocked by the result each time it happens.


